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State Regulation of Local Labor Relations:
The Demise of Home Rule in California?
By JOHN W. WITT*
C ALioRiA cities governed under the framework of constitutionally
authorized city charters are, in legal theory at least, supposed to be
free from state interference in the management of their own "muni-
cipal affairs."' Nothing would appear to be more of a 'municipal af-
fair" than the relationship of a city government to its employees. In-
deed, if it is assumed that the most important function of the munici-
pal legislative body, the city council, is to oversee the expenditure of
the public funds entrusted to it, it is hard to imagine how it can do so
effectively unless it has full control over its largest expenditure item-
the public payroll. Nevertheless, bills are introduced at each session
of the legislature which, if passed, would dictate to California cities the
details of municipal labor relations.2 The end result of this practice
may be to remove the most substantial part of the city council's tradi-
tional power over the municipal purse strings and to substitute state-
mandated salary and fringe benefit minimums for city employees and
third-party dispute-settling schemes in municipal labor disputes. In
essence, this situation foreshadows the virtual demise of the home rule
concept in California.
The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between
the state and charter cities in California with respect to municipal la-
bor relations. To do so it is necessary to study the California con-
cept of home rule and the various- legislative schemes enacted, pro-
* A.B., 1954; I.D., 1960; University of Southern California. City Attorney,
City of San Diego, California; Chairman, Municipal Labor Relations Committee,
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. [Research assistance for this article was
provided by Steve McSpadden, Third Year Class, School of Law, Boalt Hall, University
of California, Berkeley.]
1. CAL. CoNST. art. XI, § 5.
2. E.g., Cal. S.B. 333, 1971 Reg. Sess.; Cal. A.B. 98, 1970 Reg. Sess. See text
accompanying notes 49-70 infra; see note 26 infra.
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posed and otherwise contemplated which would affect employer-em-
ployee relationships at the local government level.
The Concept of Home Rule in California
Statutory History
Section 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution provides:
(a) It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the
city governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances
and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to re-
strictions and limitations provided in their several charters and
in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general
laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall
supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal af-
fairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.
In effect, section 5 says that where a city charter provides the city
legislative body with power to legislate concerning municipal affairs,
municipal ordinances and regulations pertaining thereto are effective ir-
respective of the existence of state law on the same subject.3  The
difficulty, of course, is in determining whether a matter is a "municipal
affair."
The concept of "home rule" is not unique to charter cities in
California. It was incorporated in the constitution of 1879 for general
law cities by a number of provisions designed to guarantee all Cali-
fornia cities a substantial degree of autonomy.' In 1883, enactment
of the Muncipal Corporations Act5 further defined the permissible forms
and powers of those municipal corporations not organized under char-
ters. In addition, a provision for the formation of charter cities was
also included in the 1879 state constitution.6 This provision per-
mitted the voters of a city of more than 100,000 population 7 to draft
a charter for the city's government.
In 1914, charter cities were finally freed completely from inter-
ference by the state legislature in their municipal affairs. In that year,
3. See Bellus v. City of Eureka, 69 Cal. 2d 336, 346, 444 P.2d 711, 717,
71 Cal. Rptr. 135, 141 (1968).
4. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (1879). See W. CROUCH, D. McHENRY,
J. BOLLENS & S. Scor, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICs 240-42 (2d ed. 1960).
5. Cal. Stat. 1883, ch. 49, at 93-279. With substantial modifications, the law is
now found at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 34000-45345 (West 1968), as amended, (Supp.
1971).
6. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8 (1879), now id. § 3.
7. The population minimum of 100,000 was amended downward to 10,000 in
1887 and eventually to 3500 in 1890. The 1970 constitutional revision deleted the
minimum population provision entirely.
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the language now found in section 5 of article X S was added to the
state constitution which granted authority to charter cities to make and
enforce ordinances and regulations in respect to their municipal af-
fairs.
The Case Law Controversy
The ascendancy of the state's power to legislate in derogation of
charter cities' jurisdiction in matters which arguably are municipal af-
fairs reached its height in the celebrated case of In re Lane.' In the
majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice McComb, the municipal af-
fairs clauses of old article XI of the state constitution were never even
mentioned. Instead, the court bluntly recited the so-called "pre-emp-
tion" doctrine, a legal theory which thereafter became much in vogue
in respect to state-local governmental relations.
A local municipal ordinance is invalid if it attempts to impose ad-
ditional requirements in a field that is preempted by the general
law ....
Whenever the Legislature has seen fit to adopt a general
scheme for the regulation of a particular subject, the entire con-
trol over whatever phases of the subject are covered by state legis-
lation ceases as far as local legislation is concerned ...
In determining whether the Legislature intended to occupy a
particular field to the exclusion of all local regulation, we may
look to the "whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme"
and are not required to find such an intent solely in the language
used in the statute.' 0
The concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Gibson disposed of the
municipal affairs question merely by assuming that the Los Angeles
ordinance" did not address itself to a subject matter which could be
labeled a municipal affair. No extensive analysis of the question was
undertaken.
Two and a half years after the Lane case, the California Su-
preme Court softened its position relative to charter city powers in
In re Hubbard." In considering a Long Beach ordinance forbidding
8. Prior to the revision of article XI approved by the voters in June 1970, the
"municipal affairs" clause of section 5 was found in both section 6 and section 8 of
article XI.
9. 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
10. Id. at 102-03, 372 P.2d at 899, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the doctrine of pre-emption see Note, The California City Versus Preemp-
tion by Implication, 17 HAsrINGs L.J. 603 (1966).
11. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.07 (1972). The municipal law
dealt with "resorting" to some location for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with
one to whom the accused was not married.
12. 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964).
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the playing of a game of chance for money, the court determined the
gaming statutes found in the Penal Code13 did not constitute a full occu-
pation of the field of gambling.' 4 This time the court recognized the
municipal affairs clauses of article XI and attempted to grapple with
them:
The exclusive right of a chartered city or county to regulate turns
on whether or not the subject matter is a municipal affair. In
other words, if it is exclusively a matter of state concern, char-
tered cities have no authority to act at all. . . . Of course, a
particular subject may be both a municipal affair and of state-
wide concern. Since the question whether the subject is of state
concern is often determined by whether or not the state has en-
acted legislation, preemption or full occupation of the field may
become one, but only one, test of whether the given subject is a
municipal affair. With these concepts in mind, it has been held
that a chartered city or county may not legislate in regard to
those matters covered by general law if (a) the local legislation at-
tempts to impose additional requirements [citing Lane], or (b)
the subject matter is one of state concern, and the general law oc-
cupies the entire field . . . or (c) the subject matter is of such
statewide concern that it can no longer be deemed a municipal
affair .... 15
The court, in Hubbard, ruled the Long Beach ordinance con-
cerned a "municipal affair," thus upholding its validity. No attempt
was made to define the term "municipal affair"; instead, that was left
for determination after an analysis of the facts surrounding each par-
ticular case.
16
The Hubbard court did, however, limit the municipal affairs con-
cept by holding that the power of charter cities to legislate in regard to
municipal affairs ceases to exist when a legislative subject matter is "so
fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that
it has become exclusively a matter of state concern" or the general
law is phrased in such a manner "as to indicate clearly that a paramount
state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action," or
that the matter has been partially covered by state law and the ordin-
ance in question adversely affects transient citizens in a manner out-
weighing the benefit to the local community.' 7
In its most recent definitive tussle with the municipal affairs con-
cept, the California Supreme Court in Bishop v. City of San Jose'8 has
13. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 330-37h (West 1970).
14. 62 Cal. 2d at 125, 396 P.2d at 813, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
15. Id. at 127, 396 P.2d at 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
16. Id. at 127-28, 396 P.2d at 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398.
17. Id. at 128, 396 P.2d at 815, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99.
18. 1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
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given the venerable old doctrine new life. The case involved the rela-
tions between the charter city of San Jose and its city employees.
Specifically, the dispute before the court concerned the applicability of
the prevailing wage provisions of the California Labor Code19 to elec-
tricians permanently employed by San Jose to work on additions, modi-
fication, maintenance and repair of city electrical facilities. The trial
court ruled that the kind of work performed by the electricians "and
the setting and payment of salaries for the city's own year-round, full-
time, civil service employees are purely municipal affairs"20 to which
the Labor Code provisions in question do not apply. The California
Supreme Court affirmed.
After a brief recitation of the pre-emption doctrine, the court
noted that California law does not preclude the legislature from legislat-
ing in regard to the municipal affairs of a charter city nor does it pro-
hibit a city from legislating on subjects not of a local nature. Rather,
if a conflict exists between the two, or if the legislature has disclosed
an intent to preempt the field, the question is whether general law
or local regulation is superior. The answer hinges on the question of
whether the court determines the matter is a state or municipal affair.21
The court further indicated that weight must be given to legisla-
tive intent to preempt the field and it may be that the factors which
caused the legislature to act may lead the courts to conclude the matter
is of statewide application to the exclusion of local regulation. The
legislative intent alone, however, is not enough:
[Tjhe fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted to
deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determi-
native of the issue as between state and municipal affairs, nor does
it impair the constitutional authority of a home rule city or
county to enact and enforce its own regulations to the exclusion
of general laws if the subject is held by the courts to be a munici-
pal affair rather than of statewide concern; stated otherwise, the
Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes
a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter
of statewide concern.
22
In a footnote23 the court specifically rejected any statements to the
contrary found in Hubbard. Consequently, it may be concluded as a
result of the Bishop case that a mere statement by the legislature that
a statute is applicable to charter cities does not, by itself, disqualify
19. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1771-77 (West 1971).
20. 1 Cal. 3d at 61, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
21. Id. at 62-63, 460 P.2d at 140-41, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 468-69.
22. Id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
23. Id. at 63n.6, 460 P.2d at 141n.6, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469n.6.
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such a city from enacting ordinances in conflict with the state legisla-
tion if the court views the subject matter to be a municipal affair
within the meaning of section 5 of article XI of the state constitution.
2 4
The Effect of State Labor Legislation on Local Budgets
In California, state legislation setting standards in the areas of
wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions for local governmental
employees has been rather limited. 21 Although most proposed legis-
lation which would mandate state imposed policies have failed, 26 two
major pieces of legislation on the subject have been enacted: the My-
ers-Milias-Brown Act27 and the Winton Act.28  Since provisions of
the state constitution relating to municipal affairs apply only to char-
ter cities and charter counties, 29 and since the Winton Act applies
to school districts and not to charter cities,30 the question presented
is whether the Myers-Milias-Brown Act (Public Employment Rela-
tions Act) or any similar piece of state legislation purporting to affect
municipal labor relations, is legally applicable to charter cities under
the California Constitution.
Basically, the Myers-Milias-Brown Act is an attempt to establish
24. The Bishop case was a narrow 4-3 decision. Two pro tern judges, one on
each side of the decision, heard the case. The majority opinion was rendered by Jus-
tice Burke, with Chief Justice Traynor, Justice McComb and Presiding Justice Murray
Draper of the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District concurring. The dissent
was written by Justice Peters, with Justice Mosk and Associate Justice Richard M. Sims,
Jr., of the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District concnrring. Justices To-
briner and Sullivan disqualified themselves. Since Chief Justice Traynor now has re-
tired, another case on the same issues coming before the full court would be heard by
Chief Justice Wright, by two justices who, like Chief Justice Wright, were not in-
volved in the decision in the Bishop case and by two justices who heard the case, one
on each side, majority and minority.
25. An example of such legislation is CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 45000-345 (West
(1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971). See D. BOWEN, P. FEUILLE & G. STRAUSS, UNION-
IZATION OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES: THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 107-08 (Univ. of
Cal. Inst. of Indust. Rel. 1971).
26. E.g., Cal. S.B. 333, 1971 Reg. Sess.; Cal. A.B. 98, 1970 Reg. Sess.; Cal. A.B.
374, 1969 Reg. Sess. Assembly Bill 374 in 1969 was passed by the assembly but died in
the senate. Assembly Bill 98 in 1970 was reported out of committee without further
action. Senate Bill 333 died on the floor of the senate in 1971. Other public sector
labor relations legislation which failed in the 1970 legislature included Assembly Bill
Nos. 1140, 1285 (vetoed), 1622, 2210 and 2215 and Senate Bill Nos. 33, 719, 1293
and 1294.
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE H9 3500-511 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
28. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-88 (West 1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
29. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
30. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 (West Supp. 1971).
[Vol. 23
machinery for labor-management communications in labor disputes.
31
In enacting the measure the legislature left little doubt it intended to
affect charter cities. In its definition of "public agency," to which the
act applied, the legislature included "every town, city, county, city and
county and municipal corporation, whether incorporated or not and
whether chartered or not."'3 2 The section of the act in which the fore-
going language is contained, however, is preceded directly by a section
including the following provision:
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the provi-
sions of existing state law and the charters, ordinances, and rules
of local public agencies which establish and regulate a merit or
civil service system or which provide for other methods of admin-
istering employer-employee relations. This chapter is intended,
instead, to strengthen merit, civil service and other methods of ad-
ministering employer-employee relations through the establish-
ment of uniform and orderly methods of communication between
employees and the public agency by which they are employed.
33
The apparent inconsistency in these two provisions of the act may
possibly be resolved by referral to the Bishop decision.
[Ifn the event of conflict between the regulations of state and of
local governments, or if the state legislation discloses an intent to
preempt the field to the exclusion of local regulation, the ques-
tion becomes one of predominance or superiority as between
general state laws on the one hand and the local regulations on
the other.34
The court also said:
[T]he Legislature is empowered neither to determine what con-
tutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a mat-
ter of statewide concern. 3 5
Because the court in Bishop affirmed the ruling of the trial court
that the salaries of municipal employees are a municipal affair, and in-
dicated that the concept of what constituted a municipal affair was not
governed by legislative language, the argument can be made that de-
spite the equivocal contrary declaration by the legislature in the Myers-
Milias-Brown Act, the act does not apply to charter cities because the
31. The purpose of the act is "to promote full communication between public
employers and their employees by providing a reasonable method of resolving disputes
regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . ." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1971). There is no attempt in the act to establish
standards for the wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment them-
selves.
32. Id. § 3501(b) (West 1966).
33. Id. § 3500 (West Supp. 1971).
34. 1 Cal. 3d at 62, 460 P.2d at 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
35. Id. at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
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area sought to be regulated is a municipal affair. If so, the charter
cities are free to disregard it and legislate freely in the subject matter
area.
Even in view of the fact that the Myers Act may not apply to
charter cities, and ignoring side issues such as whether the act may pre-
vail anyway absent specific local legislation on the subject, the crucial
question the passage of the act raises is whether the state government
should, in the future, be allowed to legislate on labor matters directly
affecting the budgets of local governmental agencies in a manner
which would require involuntary spending on the part of those agencies.
In theory, at least, one of the major powers, if not the major
power, of the legislative branch of government in the American sys-
tem lies in its control over expenditures of public funds. The city
council, as the legislative body of municipal government, controls the
finances of the city. 3° Quite obviously, any state legislation which re-
quires expenditures by a municipality without providing revenue
sources to match the required expenditures substantially dilutes the
control of the legislative body over municipal finances.
Salaries paid to city employees and payments made to employee
retirement funds constitute the lion's share of any city's budget. In San
Diego, for example, the amount provided for fiscal year 1971-72 for
salaries and retirement purposes was $61,390,226 or 69.4 percent
of the total budget.37 Legislative enactments of the state government
which mandate that municipalities must pay salaries set at minimums
established by the state, fund pensions at levels set by the state or
hire personnel of classes or numbers dictated by the state, would limit
seriously the ability of the public's elected representatives at the
local level-the city council-to manage the funds entrusted to them
for expenditure in the public interest. Certainly, if the California home
rule cities are to be in control of their own local destiny, the power
to control all labor relations must be found by the courts to be a "mu-
nicipal affair." There appears to be, however, a continual legislative
attempt to "pre-empt" the area through the introduction of a series of
proposed bills calling for state domination in the crucial areas of labor
relations.
36. E.g., CHARTER OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANcIsco, § 72; CHARTER
OF THE CITY OF Los ANGELES, §§ 347-48; CHARTER OF THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, CAL.
§ 71.
37. City of San Diego, Annual Budget, Fiscal 1972, at ii.
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Enacted and Proposed Legislation Affecting
Municipal Labor Relations
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act
As previously indicated, the only attempts at statewide legisla-
tion aimed at comprehensive coverage of labor relations in the local gov-
ernmental sector are the Myers-Milias-Brown Act 38 and the Winton
Act.3 9 As mentioned earlier, the latter applies to public school em-
ployers only and will not be discussed. The professed aim of the
Myers-Milias Brown Act is "to promote full communication between
public employers and their employees by providing a reasonable method
of resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment between public employers and public employee
organizations."' 0 The act establishes a relatively informal framework
for labor relations between public employees and those employers who
fit into the definition of "public agency" found in the Code.41
The act requires the governing body of a public agency or its
representatives to "meet and confer in good faith regarding wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representa-
tives of. . .recognized employee organizations .... "42 To "meet and
confer in good faith" is defined to mean that the public agency and
the recognized employee organization are mutually obliged
personally to meet and confer within a reasonable period of time
in order to exchange freely information, opinions, and proposals,
and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope
of representation.
43
It must be stressed that the requirement to meet and confer in
good faith is made mandatory on the public agency only as to "recog-
nized employee organizations."44  There is no requirement that an
employee organization must be recognized, only that recognition may
not be unreasonably withheld.45  Myers-Milias-Brown establishes no
minimum salaries, effects no public retirement plan and does not deal
with hiring policies of any public agency. It does, however, refer to
third-party-dispute-settling devices, rendering it permissive for pub-
lic agencies and recognized employee organizations to agree upon the
38. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-11 (West 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
39. CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 13080-88 (West 1969), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West Supp. 1971).
41. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
42. CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 3505 (West Supp. 1971).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 3507.
45. Id.
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appointment of a mediator in case of failure to reach agreement.4"
Suffice it to say that the act is a far cry from legislation such as New
York's Taylor Act,47 which establishes a state public employee rela-
tions board to serve as third-party mediator and which ultimately re-
quires governmental employers and employees to utilize the services of





Although the Myers-Milias-Brown Act does not significantly af-
fect the ability of local entities to maintain control of local labor re-
lation problems, there remain two areas of potential legislation where
state control could have a serious effect on the function of local gov-
ernment.
In the areas of pensions and dispute settling mechanisms, there
have been several bills introduced in the California Legislature calling
for state control.4 9 In one proposal, retirement mandates have been
directed at those cities which contract with the State Public Employee
Retirement System.5" The problem with this type of proposal is that
even though the state legislative body will surely utilize pension pro-
grams as a means to attract and hold qualified public employees, the
fact remains that the cities, in order to participate, must accept all the
features of the state system. The end result is that the state is effectu-
ally allocating a large portion of the local budget. This allocation
should be done by those persons chosen by the taxpayers who, in
actuality, carry the burden for the expenditure.
Although it is true that the affected local governments arguably
could terminate their relationships with the state system51 if they found
the increased benefits to be unpalatable, whether such a termination
46. Id. § 3505.2.
47. N.Y. Cv. SERv. LAw §§ 200-214 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
48. Id. § 209. If all the third-party procedures provided for by the Taylor Act
are unsuccessful in ending the dispute, the matter is thrown back to the legislative body
of the public employer agency. Section 209 requires the legislative body to conduct a
hearing and "thereafter, the legislative body shall take such action as it deems to be in
the public interest, including the interest of the public employees involved."
49. See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 374, 1969 Reg. Sess. Senate Bill Nos. 1293 and 1294 and
Assembly Bill No. 1622 in 1970 would have mandated third-party dispute-settlers.
50. Cal. A.B. 374, 1969 Reg. Sess. That bill would have required an otherwise
optional formula for pensions paid to retired policemen, firemen, and other members of
safety services.
51. See CAL. GOv'T CoDE §§ 20560-69 (West 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
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would be practical in terms of either legal effect or economic feasibility
is another matter. A more disturbing spectre remains the possibility
that the legislature might at some future time attempt to impose similar
mandates upon all local governments, whether they contract with the
state system or not. Such a possibility, although not presently indi-
cated by current proposed legislation, may ultimately result if the trend
for state control of pension legislation is not checked.
Exemplary of state legislative efforts directed toward imposing man-
datory third-party dispute-settling mechanisms are California Assembly
Bill 98 of 1970 and Senate Bill 333 of 1971. Assembly Bill 9852 would
have added new sections to the Myers-Milias-Brown Act to provide
that when a public employer and any "recognized employee organiza-
tion representing full-time peace officers or full-time firefighters" have
failed to reach an agreement after discussions relating to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, the matter must be sub-
mitted to an arbitration panel consisting of three members "for de-
termination." 53  Each side would have been required to appoint a
member to the arbitration board and the two members thus appointed
would have been authorized to appoint a third member. The legisla-
tion would have provided "the decision on award of the arbitration
board shall be in writing and shall be conclusive upon the public
agency and the employee organization."54
Senate Bill 33355 would have added a new chapter to the Gov-
ernment Code to be placed in the code immediately after the Myers-
Milias-Brown Act. It is directed toward the relationship between lo-
cal governmental agencies and "local safety employees," a term de-
fined to mean "any city policeman, constable, deputy sheriff, deputy
marshal, district attorney investigator, city fireman, county fireman, or
fireman of any fire district of the state."'56 The legislation would re-
quire the governing body of a public agency or its representatives to
meet and confer 57 with representatives of recognized employee or-
52. Assembly Bill 98 (Warren) of 1970 would have added new sections 3505.4,
3505.5 and 3505.6 to the Government Code.
53. Cal. A.B. 98, 1970 Reg. Sess., at 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Senate Bill 333 (Dills) of 1971 proposes to add chapter 10.5, consisting of
sections 3525 through 3539, to the Government Code.
56. Cal. S.B. 333, 1971 Reg. Sess., at 3, as amended, June 4, 1971.
57. "Meet and confer" means the parties are obliged "personally to meet and
confer within a reasonable period of time in order to exchange freely information,
opinions, and proposals, and to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the
scope of representation." CAL. Gov'T CODa § 3505 (West Supp. 1971).
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ganizations representing a majority of the agency's safety employees
at the request of the employee organization.
If agreement is reached as a result of "meet and confer" sessions,
the bill provides a written memorandum of the agreement is to be pre-
pared and, if further legislative action is required, submitted to the gov-
erning body; i.e., the city council.58 Should no agreement be reached or
if the governing body should refuse to approve the written memorandum,
the bill declares such a state of facts to be an impasse and each party
is to submit within ten days thereafter a position statement to the other
party and to the governing body if it is involved. 9 Thereafter
the parties, unless they agree otherwise, are required to go into media-
tion. When ten days go by and there is still no agreement, the parties
are required to go to fact finding. After the findings are made pub-
lic, if there is still an impasse, either party may request compulsory
and binding arbitration by a three member board of review. 60
The bill further provides:
After such referral, the board of review shall acquire such facts,
take such testimony, and interview such witnesses as it deems
necessary, and shall, not more than 30 days after the referral un-
less a different time is mutually agreed to by the parties, present
its findings and recommendations in written form to the parties.
The findings and recommendations of the board of review shall
be conclusive and binding upon the parties. 61
A complicated procedure for picking the members of the arbitration
board is also provided including selection of the third arbitrator from
a list of candidates supplied by the American Arbitration Association,
the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service and the State Conciliation
Service.62
Compulsory and binding arbitration, such as would result from the
passage of the foregoing proposed legislative measures, is presently the
most powerful threat to the ability of local governmental legislative bod-
ies to maintain control over their own budgets. In any case involving
interest negotiations 3 between employer and employee the arbitration
58. Cal. S.B. 333, 1971 Reg. Sess., at 4, as amended, June 4, 1971.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 5-6.
63. The terms "interest negotiations" and "interest arbitration" are used herein
in contradistinction to "grievance negotiations" and "grievance arbitration." A subject
of negotiation or arbitration is a matter of interest where salaries, wages, fringe bene-
fits and other terms and conditions of employment are being determined. It is a
grievance matter when employees are complaining that the employer has not fulfilled
the terms of agreement previously reached with the employees.
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award is certain to cost the governmental employer money, through
enlarged salaries, additional fringe benefits, or expenses for improved
working conditions. Whether or not the award is excessive, the leg-
islative body will have no choice but to fund the new benefits despite
the contrary wishes of its own members or of the citizens and
taxpayers.
Traditionally, public employers and their attorneys have argued
that requiring a municipality to submit its labor disputes to some sort
of binding arbitration would be to require an unlawful delegation of leg-
islative power."4 More recently, however, several states have adopted
compulsory arbitration requirements at least toward some local em-
ployees. Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have enacted binding arbi-
tration statutes for firemen and policemen, 65 while Wyoming has done
the same thing for firemen only.68 These statutes have been held
constitutional in Pennsylvania and Wyoming.
6 7
In Rhode Island the statutes came under attack as an unlawful del-
egation of legislative power to a nongovernmental body. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court rejected the argument, finding instead that the
members of the arbitration panel were public officers authorized to
exercise the sovereign powers of the municipality. 6 Similarly, one of
New York's supreme courts has ruled that binding arbitration agreed
to in a collective bargaining agreement is not an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power.69
In stressing the undesirable effects of state legislation in the labor
relations of local government, it is necessary to point out that not all
third-party dispute settling techniques deprive local legislative bodies
of the ability to control municipal affairs. It is only when one speaks
64. This argument is based on a line of cases beginning with Doughterty v.
Austin, 94 Cal. 601, 28 P. 834, 29 P. 1092 (1892), involving delegation of its power
by the state legislature. Its application to delegation of legislative power by city coun-
cils is made clear in Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 375, 445 P.2d 303, 305, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 687, 689 (1968); Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d 544, 548, 84 Cal. Rptr.
443, 444-45 (1970), and City of Redwood City v. Moore, 231 Cal. App. 2d 563,
575-77, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1965).
65. PA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-217.10 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.1 to
28-9.2-14 (1969).
66. Wyo. Stat. 1957, ch. 1967, §§ 27-265 to 27-273.
67. Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); State v. City of Lara-
mie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
68. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I.
1969).
69. Central School Dist. v. Litz, 60 Misc. 2d 1009, 304 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct.
1969).
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of "compulsory" or "binding" arbitration that concepts are considered
which may result in ultimate loss of authority by a local legislative body
over its own budget.70  Where voluntary arbitration is involved, the
question becomes a constitutional one of whether or not a local legis-
lative body can delegate control over its own budget to a third party
not directly answerable to the electorate. A question of intergovern-
mental relations arises where the state government mandates to local
government the requirement of compulsory and binding arbitration,
again forcing the local legislative body to surrender its control over the
municipal purse strings to a third party.
Conclusion
Municipal lawyers, deeply engaged in the pressing day-to-day prob-
lems of their clients, often are unaware of the continuing struggle be-
tween state and local governments over the right to determine the des-
tiny, or at least significant parts of the destiny, of each local commun-
ity in California. Ultimate control of government in a very real and
practical sense lies in the hands of those who hold the power of appro-
priation of public funds. It seems proper that the appropriation power
should be held by officials responsible to an electorate from which most
of the funds in question are raised.
At the local level, perhaps at every level, the bulk of the gov-
ernmental budget is spent for manpower. 7 Whenever legislation en-
acted by the state operates to remove from the hands of local legis-
lative bodies the authority to make the -ultimate decisions relating to
expenditure of funds for public personnel purposes it significantly de-
prives them of control over the governmental entity they were elected
to supervise.
At the present time, the California Legislature has not enacted
any labor legislation that has the effect of depriving local entities of
70. Arbitration can be either "advisory" or "binding," "voluntary" or "com-
pulsory." It is "advisory" when the parties are not bound legally by the result,
"binding" when they are. The arbitration is "voluntary" when it is undertaken on
agreement of the parties. It is "compulsory" when it is required by law. See Ander-
son, Public Employee Bargaining, 1 URBAN LAW. 312 (1969); Stutz, The Resolution of
Inpasses In the Public Sector, 1 URBAN LAW. 320 (1969).
71. About 69.4% of the City of San Diego's annual expenditures from general
government funds during Fiscal Year 1971-72 are budgeted for salaries and retirement.
City of San Diego, Annual Budget, Fiscal 1972, p. ii. Throughout the United States,
municipal expenditures for personnel constitute some 64.3% of current operations ex-
penditures. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT AssoCIATION, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR
BoOK 1970, at 226-27.
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any substantial degree of power. Proposed measures, however, indi-
cate an increasing legislative intent to make labor relations a matter of
statewide concern. Should there be a judicial determination that labor
problems are not the municipal affairs of the local entities, and are
statewide by nature, the concept of charter cities in California will be-
come a mere fiction with the state effectively in control of the bulk of
the municipal function.

